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ivAbstract
This paper examines the country’s investment incentive program for
foreign investors and its success in attracting substantial FDI inflows.
The analysis compares the FDI incentive system and FDI performance of
the Philippines with other Asian countries. Since it is difficult to untangle
the effect of tax incentives from other factors, the analysis also takes into
account other factors such as level of competitiveness, costs of doing
business, and availability of infrastructure. Our experience tends to suggest
that in the absence of fundamental factors such as economic conditions
and political climate, tax incentives alone are not enough to generate a
substantial effect on investment decisions of investors nor can they
compensate for the deficiencies in the investment environment.
v1
1 Introduction
In the last two decades, developing countries like the Philippines liberalized
their policies to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. Countries
viewed FDI as a potential source of employment and exports, along with
spillover benefits from the knowledge and technology that FDI inflows
bring. Thus, governments have competed in offering various investment
incentives to influence investors’ location decisions. These investment
incentives include fiscal measures such as reduced tax rates on profits,
tax holidays, import duty exemptions, and accounting rules allowing
accelerated depreciation and loss carry forwards for tax purposes.
There are currently two viewpoints on the importance of investment
incentives on the location of FDI. The early literature on the determinants
of FDI viewed investment incentives as a relatively minor determinant.
Most econometric studies showed that investors are influenced in their
decisions by strong economic fundamentals of the host economies. The
most important determinants consisted of market and political factors
like market size and level of real income, worker skill levels, availability
of infrastructure and other resources that facilitate efficient specialization
of production, trade policies, and political and macroeconomic stability
(Blomström and Kokko 2003).
With increasing globalization and the liberalization of trade and
capital flows, the view on the limited effect of incentives on FDI has
changed. More recently, econometric studies suggest that incentives have
become more significant determinants of FDI flows. Recent studies indicate
that FDI is lower in regions with higher corporate taxes. Based on
econometric studies, the elasticity of FDI with respect to after-tax rate of
return was found to be approximately unity (Hanson 2001). Hines (1996)
found that US inward FDI flows originating from tax exemption countries
were significantly more sensitive to US statutory corporate tax rates than
FDI originating from tax credit countries. Using bilateral FDI flows
between 11 OECD countries from 1984 to 2000, Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2003)
found that FDI flows respond asymmetrically to tax rate differentialsFDI Investment System and FDI Inflows: the Philippine Experience
2
between countries and that credit and exemption rules have an important
effect.
 However, among developing countries, the empirical evidence seems
to indicate that tax incentives have little effect on FDI flows. In Brazil,
extensive tax incentives resulted in significant revenue losses compared
to the investment generated (Estache and Gaspar 1995). Boadway et al.
(1995) found that tax holidays in Malaysia were of little value to the target
firms. Halvorsen (1995) found that rates of return in supported projects
in Thailand were so high that they would have taken place even without
incentives. Wells et al. (2001) found that tax incentives in Indonesia have
done little to spur incentives.
This paper looks at the experience of the Philippines in attracting
FDI inflows focusing on fiscal incentives. Has the country’s investment
incentive program for foreign investors been successful in attracting
substantial FDI inflows? The analysis will compare the performance of
the Philippines with other Asian countries. It is difficult to untangle the
effect of tax incentives from other factors. Thus, in the paper, the analysis
will take into account not only corporate taxation but also other important
factors such as level of competitiveness, costs of doing business, and
availability of infrastructure.
The paper is divided into eight sections. After the introduction, a
brief overview of the tax policy reforms in the Philippines is presented in
the second section. The third section discusses the current structure of
taxation in the country. The fourth section reviews the Philippine FDI
policy while the fifth section presents the various tax and other fiscal
incentive packages that the country offers. The sixth section presents the
FDI performance, trends, distribution by sector, and its sources. The
seventh section compares the FDI performance of the Philippines vis-à-
vis its Asian neighbors, along with indicators of major FDI determinants.
The final section summarizes the main findings and policy implications of
the paper.3
In the last two decades, the Philippines has witnessed two major episodes
of tax policy reforms, first in 1986 and another in 1997. The 1986 Tax
Reform Package (TxRP) was designed to promote a fair, efficient, and
simple tax system. Prior to 1986, the income tax system had two tax
schedules for (i) compensation and income (salaries and wages) category
under a gross income scheme of nine steps from 1 percent to 35 percent
and (ii) business and professional income on a net basis of five steps from
5 percent to 60 percent. A complicated sales tax structure existed consisting
of sales/turnover tax, along with a host of other indirect taxes such as
compensating tax, miller’s tax, contractor’s tax, broker’s tax, and film lessor
and distributor’s tax. Excise taxes were imposed on petroleum products,
alcoholic beverages, cigars and cigarettes, fireworks, cinematographic
films, automobiles, and other products classified as nonessential goods.
The 1986 TxRP unified the dual tax schedules applicable to individual
income by adopting the lower zero to 35 percent tax schedule for both
compensation and profit incomes. It also increased personal and additional
exemptions to adjust for inflation and eliminated the taxation of those
earning below the poverty threshold. To improve the fairness of the
individual income tax system, the TxRP allowed the separate treatment
of the incomes of spouses. Moreover, it increased the final withholding
tax rate on interest income (from 17.5%) and royalties (from 15%) to a
uniform rate of 20 percent. The final withholding tax previously imposed
on dividends was phased out.
With respect to corporate income tax, the TxRP unified the earlier
dual rate of 25 percent and 35 percent levied on corporate income to 35
percent. In the area of indirect taxes, it introduced a value added tax
(VAT) rate of 10 percent to replace sales tax and other taxes. It also
converted the unit rates formerly used for excise taxes to ad valorem rates.
With regard to international trade taxes, the TxRP abolished export taxes
and allowed further reduction in tariff rates.
2 Tax Policy Reforms in the Philippines:
Mid-1980s to the PresentFDI Investment System and FDI Inflows: the Philippine Experience
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There is broad consensus that the 1986 TxRP had a significant
positive impact on the Philippine tax system. This is indicated by
improvements in the tax effort, measured by the ratio of total tax revenue
to gross national product (GNP), which rose sharply from an average of
11.3 percent of GNP during the period 1975-1985 to 16.2 percent in 1986.
The share of taxes on income and profits expanded substantially from an
average of 25.2 percent in 1975–1985 to 37.1 percent in 1996. This
represented a positive development from the viewpoint of equity.
Meanwhile, the share of excise taxes and import duties to total tax revenue
dropped markedly from an average of 18 percent in 1975–1985 to 13.2
percent; and from 25.7 percent in 1975–1985 to 18.6 percent, respectively
(Manasan 2002a). In terms of the overall responsiveness of the tax system
to changes in economic activity, Diokno (2005) found that, on the average,
this indicator increased from 0.9 percent during the period 1980–1985 to
1.5 percent in 1986–1991.
After 1987, the government legislated more tax policy changes
although it should be noted that some of these were not consistent with
the earlier reforms implemented under the TxRP. For instance, the
Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme (SNITS), passed in 1992, reverted
the individual income tax system to the scheduler approach. This imposed
different rate schedules to income from different sources, thus allowing
nonuniform effective tax rates to be applied to waged, nonwaged, and
mixed income earners. From 1992 to 1998, the Philippine Congress
legislated 10 new tax measures that affected revenues positively and 28
tax measures that negatively affected revenues as they eroded the tax
base by granting tax incentives and higher personal and additional
exemptions (Diokno 2005).
To remove incentive distortions and boost taxation, the government
embarked on another round of structural reform through the
Comprehensive Tax Reform Program (CTRP). In February 1994,
Administrative Order 112 created a Presidential Task Force on Tax and
Tariff Reforms. The Task Force was chaired by the Secretary of Finance
with members from the government, private sector, and the academe. It
crafted a package of recommendations which formed the CTRP that was
intended to widen the tax base, simplify the tax structure to minimize tax
evasion, and make the tax system more elastic and easier to administer.
The CTRP was presented before Congress in February 1996. While
it was conceived to be legislated as a comprehensive measure, its actual
legislation was carried out in a piecemeal fashion spanning over nearly
two years of discussion and debate. As described by the Department of5
Tax Policy Reforms in the Philippines: Mid-1980s to the Present
Finance (2003), “reforming the tax system is controversial in nature. Vested
political and economic groups are expected to lobby hard in protecting
their interests. Powerful lobbying can result in the insertion of provisions
that allow exemptions and uneven tax treatment for certain groups,
services, and taxpayers.”
The major components of the CTRP were enacted into various laws
beginning in June 1996 with the passing of Republic Act (RA) 8184. This
allowed the restructuring of the excise tax on petroleum products (from
ad valorem to specific) together with tariff restructuring. In November
1996, RA 8240 was legislated to shift the excise tax on fermented liquor,
distilled spirits, and cigarettes from the ad valorem scheme (taxes are
computed based on factory price) back to the specific tax system (taxes
are based on volume of product sold).
RA 8241 amended RA 7716 or the Expanded VAT (EVAT) Law, which
was approved in May 1994 to widen the VAT tax base and improve its
administration. However, RA 8241 or the improved VAT Law introduced
additional items that are exempted from the EVAT, which had the effect
of narrowing the tax base. Specifically, the improved VAT Law resulted
in the following:
z restored the VAT exempt status of cooperatives
z expanded the coverage of the term “simple processes” by including
broiling and roasting
z expanded the coverage of the term “original state” by including
molasses
z expanded the list of items that are exempted under the EVAT to
include importation of meat; sale or importation of coal and natural
gas in whatever form or state; educational services rendered by
private educational institutions duly accredited by the Commission
on Higher Education; printing, publication, importation or sale of
books, newspapers, magazines, reviews or bulletins; operators of
taxicabs, rent-a-car companies; operators of tourist buses; small
radio and television broadcasting franchise grantees; sale of
properties used for low-cost and socialized housing; and the lease
of residential units with a monthly rental not exceeding 8,000
pesos per month.
The final component, RA 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997, was
legislated in December 1997. RA 8424 restructured individual and
corporate income tax through the following major provisions:
z phased reduction in the corporate income tax rate from 35 percent
in 1997 to 32 percent from 2000 onwardsFDI Investment System and FDI Inflows: the Philippine Experience
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z levy of a two percent minimum corporate income tax rate
z adoption of the net operating loss carry forward (NOLCO)
z accelerated depreciation using double declining balance or sum-
of-the-years digits
z introduction of a tax on fringe benefits
z re-imposition of the final withholding tax on dividends although
intercorporate dividends remain exempt
z levy of a final withholding tax of 7.5 percent on interest earned by
residents on foreign currency deposits
z increase in the level of personal exemptions for the individual
income tax
z gradual reduction of the top marginal tax rate for the individual
income tax from 35 percent in 1997 to 32 percent in 2000 onwards.
There is general sentiment among tax experts in the country that
the CTRP version of Congress has departed significantly from its original
objectives of providing a simple and transparent tax system. Manasan
(2002b, 2004) indicated that the various bills adopted by Congress deleted
key proposed features of the original tax reform package. Hence, its overall
impact on the revenue performance of the tax system has been negative.
Total tax revenue effort declined continuously from 16.98 percent of GDP
in 1997 to 12.54 percent in 2002 with a slight improvement (12.7%) in
2003. Manasan pointed out that the adoption of specific rates for excise
taxes, while meant to address evasion, reduced the buoyancy of the tax
system because the indexation provision that was part of the original
proposal was not approved by Congress. Moreover, the rationalization of
fiscal incentives, which was an integral part of the proposal when it was
first conceived, was not passed in Congress. While the revenue losses from
the increase in personal exemptions were readily felt, the expected increase
in revenues from the provisions on corporate income tax were not realized
at the same time due to delays in the issuance of the implementing
regulations of the said provisions.
Diokno (2005) also attributed the progressively declining tax effort
and nonresponsiveness of the tax system to changes in economic activity
to the 1997 CTRP. He emphasized that the CTRP may be considered a
major failure due to three factors: (i) nonlegislation of the rationalization
of fiscal incentives; (ii) delays in the implementation of some provisions
that could have broaden the tax base; and (iii) inclusion of measures that
are bereft of any rational justification such as the VAT on banks and
financial intermediaries.7
Tax Policy Reforms in the Philippines: Mid-1980s to the Present
Very recently, a new VAT Law under RA 9337 has been implemented
as a major part of the government’s efforts to address the country’s serious
fiscal problems. Under RA 9337, effective November 1, 2005, a 10 percent
VAT has been imposed on oil and electricity, coupled with an increase in
the corporate income tax rate from 32 percent to 35 percent until 2008, to
be reduced to 30 percent by January 2009. The VAT was also raised to 12
percent in February 2006.FDI Investment System and FDI Inflows: the Philippine Experience
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The National Internal Revenue Code contains the laws governing taxation
in the Philippines. This code underwent substantial revision with the
passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1997 that took effect on January 1, 1998.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), which is under the Department of
Finance, administers taxation. Its main functions consist of assessment,
collection, processing, and taxpayer assistance. The BIR is headed by
a commissioner who has exclusive and original jurisdiction to interpret
the provisions of the code and other tax laws. The commissioner also has
the powers to decide disputed assessments, grant refunds of taxes, fees,
and other charges and penalties, modify payment of any internal revenue
tax, and abate or cancel a tax liability. Taxpayers can appeal decisions by
the commissioner directly to the Court of Tax Appeals.
Philippine income tax system
The primary types of taxation are corporate income tax, individual income
tax, value added tax, excise tax, customs duties, and local taxes.
Corporate income tax
Regular corporate income tax
The regular corporate income tax rate, which applies to both domestic
and resident foreign corporations,1 was 32 percent of taxable income until
October 31, 2005. Effective November 1, 2005, this has been raised to 35
percent. This is expected to be reduced to 30 percent by 2009. For domestic
corporations, the tax base is net worldwide income while for resident
foreign corporations, the tax base is net Philippine-source income.
3 Current Philippine Tax Structure
__________________
1 A domestic corporation is a corporation organized under Philippine laws. A foreign corporation
is considered a resident of the Philippines if it is engaged in trade or business in the Philippines
(example, through a branch).9
Current Philippine Tax Structure
Minimum corporate income tax (MCIT)
Beginning on the fourth taxable year from the time a corporation
commences its business operations, an MCIT of two percent of the gross
income2 as of the end of the taxable year shall be imposed, if the MCIT is
greater than the regular corporate income tax. If the regular income tax
is higher than the MCIT, the corporation does not pay the MCIT. Any
excess of the MCIT over the normal tax shall be carried forward and
credited against the normal income tax for the three immediately
succeeding taxable years. Corporations that are subject to special corporate
tax system do not fall within the coverage of the MCIT.
Capital gains
For domestic and resident foreign corporations, capital gains are generally
subject to the regular corporate income tax rate of 32 percent. However,
net capital gains from the sale or exchange of shares of stock that are not
listed and traded in the local stock exchange are subject to a capital gains
tax or five percent on net capital gains not exceeding P100,000 and 10
percent on the excess. If the shares sold are listed and traded through the
stock exchange, the tax shall be one-half of one percent of the gross selling
price. The capital gains tax is six percent of the gross selling price or fair
market value, whichever is higher, on sale or exchange of land or buildings
not actually used in business and treated as capital asset.
Fringe benefits
Tax fringe benefits granted to supervisory and managerial employees are
subject to a tax of 32 percent of the grossed-up monetary value of the
fringe benefit. The grossed-up monetary value of the fringe benefit is
determined by dividing the actual monetary value of the fringe benefit by
68 percent. Fringe benefits given by offshore banking units (OBUs),
regional or area headquarters, regional operating headquarters of
multinational companies, petroleum contractors and subcontractors are
taxed at 15 percent of the grossed-up monetary value of the fringe benefit,
which is determined by dividing the actual monetary value of the fringe
benefit by 85 percent. The fringe benefits tax is payable by the employer.
However, fringe benefits that are required by the nature of, or which are
__________________
2 Gross income refers to gross sales less returns, discounts, and cost of goods sold. Passive
income, which has been subject to a final tax at source, does not form part of gross income for
purposes of the MCIT. Cost of goods sold includes all business expenses directly incurred to
produce the merchandise to bring them to their present location and use.FDI Investment System and FDI Inflows: the Philippine Experience
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necessary to, the trade, business, or profession of the employer or which
are for the convenience of the employer are not taxable.
Branch profits
Any profit remitted by a branch (except those activities registered with
the Philippine Economic Zone Authority or PEZA) to its head office is
subject to a tax of 15 percent. The tax is based on the total profits applied
or earmarked for remittance without any deduction for the tax component
thereof.
Improperly accumulated earnings
A tax of 10 percent is imposed on the improperly accumulated earnings of
a corporation, except in the case of publicly held corporations, banks and
other nonbank financial intermediaries, and insurance companies. This
provision is aimed at corporations that accumulate income beyond the
reasonable needs of their business, rather than distributing that income
through dividends that are subject to tax. Unless proven otherwise, these
are considered as improperly accumulated earnings for the purpose of
avoidance of tax on shareholders.
Calculation of taxable income
The foreign income of a domestic corporation is taxable. Double taxation3
is avoided through the tax credit of foreign taxes paid. The availability of
tax credits is, however, subject to the per country and overall limitations.
Alternatively, taxpayers may elect to claim the foreign tax as a deduction
from taxable income.
In calculating taxable income, corporations are allowed to claim
various itemized deductions from their gross income, including ordinary
and necessary business expenses (see Box 1).
Business-related losses during the taxable year, which have not been
compensated for by insurance or other forms of indemnity, are allowed to
be taken as deductions.
No deduction is allowed for losses from transactions between certain
related parties. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has the power to
allocate and adjust certain items of income and deduction among related
__________________
3 The Philippines has tax treaties with the following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil,
Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Romania, Russia,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, and the United States.11
Current Philippine Tax Structure
Box 1: Tax concepts
Taxable income means gross income less the deductions and/or personal and additional exemp-
tions, if any, authorized for such types of income, by the Tax Code or other special laws.
Gross income derived from business is gross sales less sales returns, discounts and allow-
ances, and cost of goods sold. Cost of goods sold includes all business expenses directly in-
curred to produce the merchandise to bring them to their present location and use.
For a trading or merchandising concern, cost of goods sold includes the invoice cost of the
goods sold, plus import duties, freight in transporting the goods to the place where the goods are
actually sold, including insurance while the goods are in transit.
For a manufacturing concern, cost of goods manufactured and sold includes all costs of
production of finished goods, such as raw materials used, direct labor and manufacturing over-
head, freight cost, insurance premiums, and other costs incurred to bring the raw materials to the
factory or warehouse.
Gross income means all income derived from whatever source. Gross income includes, but
is not limited to, the following:
z Compensation for services, in whatever form paid, including but not limited to fees, salaries,
wages, commissions, and similar item
z Gross income derived from the conduct of trade or business or the exercise of profession
z Gains derived from dealings in property
z Interest, rents, royalties, dividends
z Annuities, prizes and winnings, pensions
z Partner’s distributive share from the net income of the general professional partnerships
Exclusions from gross income include
z Life insurance
z Amount received by insured as return of premium
z Gifts, bequests, and devises
z Compensation for injuries or sickness
z Income exempt under treaty
z Retirement benefits, pensions, gratuities, etc.
z Miscellaneous items
z Income derived by foreign government
z Income derived by the government or its political subdivision
z Prizes and awards in sport competition
z Prizes and awards which met the conditions set in the Tax Code
z 13th month pay and other benefits
z GSIS, SSS, Medicare, and other contributions
z Gain from the sale of bonds, debentures, or other certificate of indebtedness
z Gain from redemption of shares in mutual fund
Allowable deductions from gross income: Except for taxpayers earning compensation in-
come arising from personal services rendered under an employer-employee relationships where
the only deduction up to a maximum limit of P2,400 per year per family is the premium payment on
health and/or hospitalization insurance, a taxpayer may opt to avail any of the following allowable
deductions from gross income:FDI Investment System and FDI Inflows: the Philippine Experience
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(i) Optional Standard Deduction - an amount not exceeding 10 percent of the gross income; or
(ii) Itemized Deductions which include the following:
- Expenses - Interest
- Taxes - Losses
- Bad debts - Depreciation
- Depletion of oil and gas wells and mines - Research and development
- Charitable contributions and other contributions - Pension trusts
Source: Bureau of Internal Revenue
Box 1 (cont’d.)
taxpayers. Transfer prices between related parties are carefully examined
to make sure that these are at arm’s length and reasonable under the
circumstances.
Subject to certain conditions, net operating loss in a taxable year is
allowed to be carried over to the next three succeeding years following the
year of loss.
Capital gains are gains arising from the sale or exchange of capital
assets. Losses from the sale or exchange of capital assets are deductible
but only to the extent of capital gains.
All corporations subject to income tax must file quarterly income tax
returns on a cumulative basis for the preceding quarter/s upon which
their income tax is paid. The quarterly return for the first three quarters
must be filed and the tax thereon must be paid not later than 60 days
after the close of each quarter. A final adjustment return covering the
total net taxable income must be filed on or before the fifteenth day of the
fourth month following the close of the fiscal year.
Transfer pricing
The country’s transfer pricing law was patterned after that of the United
States Tax Code. The BIR Commissioner is empowered to adjust the prices
used between related parties if they do not comply with the arm’s length
standard. The BIR has largely limited its scrutiny of transfer pricing issues
to low-interest loans and service fees.4 Intercompany charges such as
payments to foreign affiliates for management fees, research and
development, and general and administrative expenses are deductible.
__________________
4 Isla Lipana and Co./Price Waterhouse Coopers (2005).13
However, if the amounts paid are not consistent with the arm’s length
principle, the BIR is authorized to make an adjustment for tax purposes.
Individual income tax
Compensation income
Income derived from an employer-employee relationship is subject to tax
ranging from 5 percent to 32 percent (see table below). Taxable
compensation income includes salaries, wages, bonuses, allowances, tax
reimbursements, and most fringe benefits.
Current Philippine Tax Structure
Taxable Income Tax Rate
Not over P10,000 5% 
Over P10,000 but not over P30,000 P500 + 10% of the excess over P10,000
Over P30,000 but not over P70,000 P2,500 + 15% of the excess over P30,000
Over P70,000 but not over P140,000 P8,500 + 20% of the excess over P70,000
Over P140,000 but not over P250,000 P22,500 + 25% of the excess over P140,000
Over P250,000 but not over P500,000 P50,000 + 30% of the excess over P250,000
Over P500,000 P125,000 + 32% of the excess over P500,000
Citizens employed by regional or area headquarters and regional
operating headquarters of multinational companies offshore banking units,
and petroleum service contractors who occupy the same position as aliens
employed by these entities are subject to a final tax of 15 percent on their
gross income.
Business income
Income (after allowable deductions) of citizens and resident aliens derived
from trade, business, or practice of profession is also subject to the
graduated 5 percent to 32 percent income tax. The same rates apply to
resident citizens and resident aliens whether engaged in trade or business,
practising profession, or employed.
In lieu of the allowed itemized deductions, citizens and resident aliens
engaged in trade or business or practising a profession may elect a standard
deduction in an amount not exceeding 10 percent of their gross income.
Personal and additional exemptions
Individual taxpayers are entitled to personal exemptions: P20,000 for
single individuals; P25,000 for heads of families; and P32,000 each for
married individuals. A married individual or head of a family is allowedFDI Investment System and FDI Inflows: the Philippine Experience
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an additional exemption of P8,000 for each dependent not exceeding four.
Married individuals are required to compute their individual income tax
returns separately. The additional exemption for each dependent shall be
claimed only by the husband unless he waives the right in favor of his
wife.
Passive income
Interest on any currency bank deposit and yield or other monetary benefit
from deposit substitutes and from trust fund and similar arrangements is
subject to a 20 percent final tax. Interest from depository bank under the
expanded Foreign Currency Deposit (FCD) system is subject to a seven
and a half percent final tax. Interest earned by an individual from long-
term deposits or investments is exempt from tax. However, if the depositor
or investor preterminates the deposit or investment before the fifth year,
a final tax is imposed in accordance with the following schedule: (i) four
years to less than five years: five percent ; (ii) three years to less than four
years: 12 percent; and (iii) less than three years: 20 percent. Royalties are
generally taxed at 20 percent; 10 percent, if from books, literary works,
and musical compositions. Prizes exceeding P10,000 and other winnings
(except Philippine Charity Sweepstakes and Lotto winnings) are taxed at
20 percent.
A final tax of 10 percent is imposed on dividends received from
domestic corporations.
Net capital gains from the sale of capital asset held by an individual
are fully taxable if the capital asset was held for 12 months or less, and 50
percent taxable if it was held for more than 12 months.
Net capital gains from the sale of stocks in a domestic corporation
are taxed at rates depending on whether the stocks are listed and traded
in the stock exchange or not. If the stocks are unlisted or listed but not
traded in the stock exchange, the tax is five percent for the first P100,000
of net capital gains and 10 percent for the excess over P100,000. If the
stocks are listed and traded in the stock exchange, the presumed gain is
taxed at one-half of one percent of the gross selling price of such shares.
Presumed capital gains from sale of real property held as a capital
asset located in the Philippines are taxed at six percent of the gross selling
price or the fair market value, whichever is higher. Gains from the sale of
principal residence by natural persons may qualify for exemption from
the six percent capital gains tax if the proceeds from such sale are fully
utilized in acquiring or building a new principal residence within 18
calendar months from the date of sale.15
Current Philippine Tax Structure
Value added tax
A 12%5 VAT is imposed on the gross selling price or gross value in money
of goods, services, and properties sold, either bartered or exchanged.  Any
excise tax on these goods also forms part of the gross selling price. In the
case of imported goods, VAT is based on the total value of the goods as
determined by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) plus customs duties, excise
taxes, and incidental charges. The VAT is 0 percent on certain transactions
such as export sales of goods and sales of services to nonresidents paid for
in foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and
regulations of the BSP.
While the obligation to collect and remit rests with the seller, the
cost of the tax may be passed on to the buyer, transferee, or lessee of the
goods, properties, or services. A VAT-registered entity may credit the VAT
paid on purchases of other goods and services (input tax) against the tax
on its current period sales of goods or services (output tax). Until October
31, 2005, if the amount of input tax is greater than the amount of output
tax, the excess was credited against the succeeding period’s output VAT.
Effective November 1, 2005, the new VAT law has imposed a provision
limiting the amount of input tax that may be credited against the output
tax to 70 percent when the amount of input tax exceeds the amount of
output tax.
Excise taxes
Excise taxes are imposed on certain goods (such as cigarettes, liquor, and
motor vehicles) manufactured or produced in the Philippines for domestic
sale or consumption or for any other disposition. Excise taxes are also
imposed on certain imported goods, in addition to the VAT and customs
duties.
Customs duties
Goods are subject to customs duties upon importation except as otherwise
provided for under the Tariff and Customs Code or special laws.
Local taxes
Under the Local Government Code, local government units (LGUs) are
authorized to tax all activities except those expressly prohibited by the
Code or other laws. Income tax, customs duty, documentary stamp tax,
__________________
5 Prior to February 2006, the rate was 10 percent.FDI Investment System and FDI Inflows: the Philippine Experience
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and estate and gift taxes are among the taxes that cannot be levied by
LGUs.
Total revenue collections
Figure 1 presents the distribution of the 2003 revenue collections of the
BIR and the BOC. Value added taxes accounted for 25 percent of the total
revenue collections. This is followed by corporate income taxes that
registered a share of around 21 percent of the total and individual income
taxes that accounted for 17 percent. Excise taxes represented a share of
13 percent while import duties accounted for about eight percent.
Table 1 shows the total revenue collections of the BIR and the BOC
from 1996 to 2003. As percentages of gross domestic product, both internal
revenue and customs collections have been steadily declining after 1996.
In the case of internal revenue collections, an increase in 1997 was
registered, but this continued to decline from 1998 to 2003. This indicates
the deteriorating tax effort of the government. As a result, the country
has been facing a chronic fiscal deficit. National government debt stood at
PhP3.355 trillion in 2003, which accounted for around 78 percent of the
gross domestic product (GDP). Public sector debt represented
approximately 138 percent of the GDP during the same year. Given this
critical fiscal position of the public sector, the VAT has been raised from
10 to 12 percent in February 2006. Moreover, VAT on oil and electricity
has also been imposed, along with increases in the corporate tax rates


















Figure 1.Distribution of revenue collections, 200317
Current Philippine Tax Structure
Table 1. Total revenue collections (in million pesos)
Year BIR % of GDP BOC % of GDP Total
1996 260774 12.01 104566 4.81 365340
1997 314698 12.97 94800 3.91 409498
1998 337177 12.65 76005 2.85 413182
1999 341320 11.47 86497 2.91 427817
2000 360802 10.76 95006 2.83 455808
2001 388679 10.70 96232 2.65 484911
2002 394549 9.96 96251 2.43 490800
2003 426010 9.92 106092 2.47 532102
Sources: Bureau of Internal Revenue, Bureau of Customs, and National
Income AccountsFDI Investment System and FDI Inflows: the Philippine Experience
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Like most developing countries, the attitude of the Philippines toward
FDI has changed considerably beginning in the 1980s. Recognizing the
need to expand exports and the potential economic contribution of FDI
through the transfer of knowledge and experience, the Philippines adopted
more open and flexible policies toward FDI. Simultaneous with the market-
oriented reforms consisting of trade liberalization, privatization, and
economic deregulation that the country carried out between the 1980s
and the 1990s, the country accelerated the FDI liberalization process
through the legislation of RA 7042 or the Foreign Investment Act (FIA) in
June 1991.
The FIA considerably liberalized the existing regulations by allowing
foreign equity participation up to 100 percent in all areas not specified in
the Foreign Investment Negative List (or FINL, which originally consisted
of three component lists: A, B, and C).6 Prior to this, 100 percent eligibility
for foreign investment was subject to the approval of the Board of
Investments (BOI). The FIA was expected to provide transparency by
disclosing in advance, through the FINL, the areas where foreign
investment is allowed or restricted. It also reduced the bureaucratic
discretion arising from the need to obtain prior government approval
whenever foreign participation exceeded 40 percent.
Over time, the negative list has been reduced significantly. In March
1996, RA 7042 was amended through the passing of RA 8179 that further
liberalized foreign investments allowing greater foreign participation in
areas that were previously restricted. This abolished List C that limited
foreign ownership in “adequately served” sectors. Currently, the FIA has
two component lists (A and B) covering sectors where foreign investment
4 Foreign Direct Investment Policy
__________________
6 List A consists of areas reserved for Filipino nationals by virtue of the Constitution or specific
legislations like mass media, cooperatives, or small-scale mining. List B consists of areas
reserved for Filipino nationals by virtue of defense, risk to health and moral, and protection of
small and medium-scale industries. List C consists of areas in which there already exists an
adequate number of establishments to serve the needs of the economy and further foreign
investments are no longer necessary.19
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is restricted. Below 100 percent are those falling under the Constitution
or those with restrictions mandated under various laws.
The mid-1990s witnessed the liberalization of the banking sector
that allowed the entry of foreign banks. The 1994 Foreign Bank
Liberalization allowed the establishment of 10 new foreign banks in the
Philippines. With the legislation of the General Banking Law (RA 8791)
in 2000, a seven-year window has been provided during which foreign
banks may own up to 100 percent of one locally incorporated commercial
or thrift bank (with no obligation to divest later).
In March 2000, the passing of the Retail Trade Liberalization Act
(RA 8762) allowed foreign investors to enter the retail business and own
them 100 percent as long as they put up a minimum of US$7.5 million
equity. Singapore and Hong Kong have no minimum capital requirement
while Thailand sets it at US$250,000. A lower minimum capitalization
threshold ($250,000) is allowed to foreigners seeking full ownership of
firms engaged in high-end or luxury products. RA 8762 also allowed foreign
companies to engage in rice and corn trade.
To develop international financial center operations in the Philippines
and facilitate the flow of international capital into the country, foreign
banks have been allowed to establish offshore banking units (OBUs). OBUs
are subject to virtually no exchange control on their offshore operations
and are not subject to tax on income they source from outside the
Philippines. Only income from foreign currency transactions with local
banks, including branches of foreign banks that are authorized by the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to transact business with OBUs and Philippine
residents, is subject to a final tax of 10 percent. Nonresidents are exempt
from income tax on income they derive from transactions with OBUs.
Incentives have also been offered to multinationals that establish
regional headquarters (RHQ) or a regional operating headquarters (ROHQ)
in the Philippines.7 Both RHQs and ROHQs are entitled to the following
__________________
7 An RHQ is a branch office that principally serves as a supervision, communications, and
coordination center for the subsidiaries, branches, or affiliates of a multinational company
operating in the Asia-Pacific region and other foreign markets. It is allowed to operate only as a
cost center, and may not participate in any manner in the management of any subsidiary or
other branch office the multinational has in the Philippines, or to solicit or market any goods or
services. An ROHQ is a branch office that is allowed to derive income in the Philippines by
performing qualifying services to its affiliates, subsidiaries, or branches in the Asia-Pacific region
(including the Philippines) and other foreign markets. The services it is able to render, however,
are limited to general administration and planning, business planning and coordination, sourcing
and procurement of raw materials and components, corporate finance advisory services,
marketing control and sales promotion, training and personnel management, logistics services,
research and development services and product development, technical support and
maintenance, data processing and communication, and business development.FDI Investment System and FDI Inflows: the Philippine Experience
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incentives: exemption from all taxes, fees, or charges imposed by a local
government unit except real property tax on land improvements and
equipment; tax and duty free importation of training materials and
equipment; and direct importation of new motor vehicles, subject to the
payment of the corresponding taxes and duties.
While substantial progress has been made in liberalizing the country’s
FDI policy, certain significant barriers to FDI entry still remain. The
sectors with foreign ownership restriction include mass media, land
ownership where foreign ownership is limited to 40 percent, natural
resources, firms that supply to government-owned corporations or agencies
(40%), public utilities (40%), and build-operate-transfer (BOT) projects
(40%).
List A
Due to constitutional constraints, List A restricts foreign investment in
the practice of licensed professions as well as in the following industries:
mass media, small-scale mining, private security agencies, and the
manufacture of firecrackers and pyrotechnic devices. Foreign ownership
ceilings are imposed on enterprises engaged in, among others, financing,
advertising, domestic air transport, public utilities, pawnshop operations,
education, employee recruitment, public works construction and repair
(except BOT and foreign-funded or assisted projects), and commercial deep
sea fishing.
The exploration and development of natural resources must be
undertaken under production sharing or similar arrangements with the
government. For small-scale projects, a company should be at least 60
percent Filipino-owned to qualify. High-cost and high-risk activities such
as oil exploration and large-scale mining are open to 100 percent foreign
ownership. In 1998, private domestic construction was deleted from List
A, lifting the 40 percent foreign ownership ceiling previously imposed on
such entities.
Rural banking remains completely closed to foreigners. In securities
underwriting, the limit on foreign ownership was raised from 40 percent
to 60 percent in 1997. The limit for financing companies was also raised to
60 percent in 1998. The insurance industry was opened up to majority
foreign ownership in 1994 with minimum capital requirements increasing
along with the degree of foreign ownership.
In retail trade, foreign equity remains banned in retail companies
capitalized at less than $2.5 million.21
List B
Under List B, foreign ownership in enterprises is generally restricted to
40 percent due to national security, defense, public health, and safety
reasons. List B also protects domestic small- and medium-sized firms by
restricting foreign ownership to no more than 40 percent in nonexport
firms capitalized at no less than US$200,000.
Land ownership
Land ownership is constitutionally restricted to Filipino citizens or to
corporations with at least 60 percent Filipino ownership. The Philippine
Constitution bans foreigners from owning land in the Philippines. Foreign
companies investing in the Philippines may lease land for 50 years,
renewable once for another 25 years, or a maximum 75 years.
BOT
The legal framework for BOT projects and similar private sector-led
infrastructure arrangements is covered under RA 6957 (as amended by
RA 7718). The BOT law limits foreign ownership to 40 percent in BOT
projects. Note that many infrastructure projects like public utilities,
franchises in railways/urban rail mass transit systems, electricity
distribution, water distribution, and telephone systems are, in general,
natural monopolies.
Omnibus Investments Code
The Omnibus Investments Code mandates the incentives and guarantees
to investments in the Philippines. Certain provisions of the incentives
law impose more stringent conditions on foreign-owned enterprises that
seek to qualify for BOI-administered incentives. In general, foreign-owned
firms producing for the domestic market must engage in a “pioneer”
activity8 to qualify for incentives. “Nonpioneer” activities are generally
Foreign Direct Investment Policy
__________________
8 Pioneer projects are those that (i) engage in the manufacture, processing, or production, and
not merely in the assembly or packaging of goods, products, commodities, or raw materials that
have not been or are not being produced in the Philippines on a commercial scale; (ii) use a
design, formula, scheme, method, process, or system of production or transformation of any
element, substance, or raw materials into another raw material or finished goods that is new
and untried in the Philippines; (iii) engage in the pursuit of agricultural, forestry, and mining
activities considered as essential to the attainment of the national goal; and (iv) produce
unconventional fuels or manufacture equipment that utilizes nonconventional sources of energy.
Nonpioneer projects include those that are engaged in common activities in the Philippines and
do not make use of new technology.FDI Investment System and FDI Inflows: the Philippine Experience
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opened up to foreign equity beyond 40 percent only if, after three years,
domestic capital proves inadequate to meet the desired industry capacity.
For firms seeking BOI incentives linked to export performance, export
requirements are higher for foreign-owned companies (at least 70% of
production should be for export) than for domestic companies (50% of
production for export).
Foreign-owned companies must divest to a maximum of 40 percent
foreign ownership within 30 years or longer as the BOI may allow. Foreign
firms that export 100 percent of production are exempt from this
divestment requirement.23
As the Philippines implemented trade reforms in the last two decades,
the country also pursued changes in its overall investment and investment
incentive policies. In 1987, a new Omnibus Investments Code was
legislated that simplified and consolidated previous investment laws and
added two measures: income tax holiday for enterprises engaged in
preferred areas of investment and labor expense allowance for tax
deduction purposes. Several other legislations containing investment
incentive packages were legislated; the most important of which were RA
7227 known as the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 and
RA 7916 or the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995.
In general, the changes in investment incentive measures that the
country adopted over time have improved the overall system of investment
in the country (Maxwell Stamp 2001). Austria (1998) also noted that these
changes were a crucial factor in building up confidence in the economic
prospects of the country. However, as the incentives to investments
evolved, a more complex system of investment promotion programs and
policies emerged.
The current system is characterized by different investment regimes
administered by different bodies consisting of the BOI, PEZA, Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), Clark Development Corporation (CDC),
and other bodies mandated by various laws to establish, maintain, and
manage special economic or free port zones. Table 2 shows a comparison
of the major incentives provided by the different investment incentive-
giving bodies. BOI-registered enterprises are allowed income tax holiday
up to eight years, tax and duty free importation of spare parts, and tax
credit on raw materials. Under EO 226, the incentives of importing capital
equipment duty and tax free and tax credit on purchase of domestic capital
equipment expired in 1997. After the lapse of the income tax holiday, the
regular corporate tax rate of 32 percent will apply to BOI enterprises.
PEZA grants the most generous incentives including income tax holiday,
basic income tax rate of five percent of gross income, and tax and duty
5 Tax Incentives and their Fiscal Measures
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free importation of capital equipment, spare parts, and raw material
inputs. Except for the income tax holiday, Clark and Subic enterprises
enjoy the same incentives available to PEZA enterprises.
Note, however, that the October 2004 and July 2005 rulings of the
Supreme Court nullified the fiscal incentives at four special economic zones
that included the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ). In March 2006,
Presidential Proclamation 1035 was signed declaring the CSEZ as a PEZA
Special Economic Zone. Still, with the Supreme Court decision, all locators
are subject to back taxes and duties. The House of Representatives passed
two bills seeking to regain the fiscal incentives and provide tax amnesty.
Currently, the bills are in the Senate for deliberation.
BOI-registered enterprises: 1987 Omnibus Investments Code
Under the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, foreign and domestic
investors may avail of fiscal and nonfiscal incentives provided they invest
in preferred areas of investment identified annually in the Investment
Priorities Plan (IPP). If the areas of investment are not listed in the IPP,
they may still be entitled to incentives, provided that:
Table 2. FDI incentives by type of investment regime
Investment Regime BOI OIC PEZA SBMA and CSEZ 
Income  4–8 years ITH 4–8 years ITH  No ITH
Others After ITH, payment of the After ITH, exemption from 5 percent tax on
regular corporate tax rate national and local taxes, gross income in
of 35 percent of taxable in lieu of this special rate lieu of all local and
income of  5 percent tax on gross national taxes
income
Importation of Tax credit Tax and duty exemption Tax and duty
raw materials exemption
and supplies
Purchase of Tax exemption within 10 Tax and duty exemption Tax and duty
breeding stocks years from registration exemption
and genetic
materials
Imported capital Tax and duty exemption Tax and duty exemption Tax and duty
equipment, spare on spare parts (duty and exemption
parts, materials, tax free importation of












* Executive Order 313 (2004) restored these incentives.25
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z at least 50 percent of production is for exports, for Filipino-owned
enterprises; and
z at least 70 percent of production is for production, for majority
foreign-owned enterprises (more than 40% of foreign equity).
In general, BOI registered enterprises are entitled to the following
incentives:
Tax exemptions
a) Income tax holiday (ITH)
z Six years for new projects granted pioneer status;
z Six years for projects locating in less developed areas (LDA),
regardless of status (pioneer or nonpioneer) and regardless of
type (new or expansion);
z Four years for new projects granted nonpioneer status; and
z Three years for expansion and modernization projects. (In
general, ITH is limited only to incremental sales in revenue/
volume.)
z An additional year may be granted in each of the following
cases:
i. The indigenous raw materials used in the manufacture of
the registered product is at least  50 percent of the total cost
of raw materials for the preceding years prior to the
extension unless the BOI prescribes a higher percentage; or
ii. The ratio of total imported and domestic capital equipment
to the number of workers for the project does not exceed
US$10,000 to one (1) worker; or
iii.The net foreign exchange savings or earnings amount to at
least US$500,000 annually during the first three (3) years
of operation.
In no case, however, shall a registered firm avail of ITH for a
period exceeding eight years.
b) Exemption from taxes and duties on imported spare parts; the
duty and tax free importation of capital equipment that expired
in 1997 was restored in May 2004 with the issuance of Executive
Order (EO) 313.
c) Exemption from wharfage dues and export tax, duty, impost, and
fees for a period of 10 years from the date of registration.
d) Tax exemption on breeding stocks and genetic materials within
10 years from the date of registration or commercial operation.FDI Investment System and FDI Inflows: the Philippine Experience
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Tax credits
a) Tax credit on the purchase of domestic breeding stocks and genetic
materials within 10 years from the date of registration or
commercial operation.
b) Tax credit on raw materials and supplies
Additional deductions from taxable income
a) For the first five years from date of registration, additional
deduction for labor expense equivalent to 50 percent of the wages
of additional skilled and unskilled workers in the direct labor force.
This incentive shall be granted only if the enterprise meets a
prescribed capital-to-labor ratio and shall not be availed of
simultaneously with ITH. This additional deduction shall be
doubled if the activity is located in an LDA.
b) Additional deduction for necessary and major infrastructure works.
This privilege, however, is not granted to mining and forestry-
related projects as they would naturally be located in certain areas
to be near their source of raw materials.
Nonfiscal incentives
a) A registered enterprise may be allowed to employ foreign nationals
in supervisory, technical, or advisory positions for five years from
date of registration. The position of president, general manager,
and treasurer of foreign-owned registered enterprises or their
equivalent shall, however, not be subject to the foregoing
limitations.
b) Simplification of customs procedures for the importation of
equipment, spare parts, raw materials and supplies, and exports
of processed products.
c) Importation of consigned equipment for a period of 10 years from
date of registration, subject to posting of a re-export bond.
d) The privilege to operate a bonded manufacturing/trading
warehouse subject to Customs rules and regulations.
PEZA-registered enterprises: Special Economic Zone Act of 1995
The Philippines was one of the first countries in Asia to establish export
processing zones (EPZs) to allow total automatic access to imports by firms
located in the zones on the condition that they will export their entire
production. In 1969, RA 5490 was legislated to pave the way for the first
EPZ in Bataan. The issuance of Presidential Decree (PD) 66 in 1972 created27
the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) to operate and manage all
Philippine export zones. PD 66 required total production of firms to be
geared entirely for exports although, in certain instances and subject to
the approval of EPZA, firms were allowed to sell 30 percent of their
production in the domestic market. Foreign ownership up to 100 percent
was permitted but only the industries being promoted were allowed to be
set up.
In 1979, EO 567 allowed the EPZA to designate a specific plant site
of an industrial firm or a group of industrial firms as a special export
processing zone that is entitled to the same incentives granted to the four
government-owned regular zones located in Bataan, Baguio, Cavite, and
Mactan. The limited success of these zones in the 1980s prompted the
government to institute changes in its EPZ policies.
In 1995, RA 7916 was legislated to shift the focus away from
government EPZs toward private industrial zones. Focus has also shifted
from the traditional EPZ in which firms must be 100 percent export
oriented and engaged in recognized manufacturing activities toward
industrial parks that allow all industries regardless of market orientation
and a  separate, fenced-in EPZ for wholly export-oriented firms.
RA 7916 replaced the EPZA and created the Philippine Economic
Zone Authority (PEZA) to manage and operate government-owned zones
and administer incentives to special economic zones (ecozones). RA 7916
also allowed greater private sector participation in zone development and
management through the provision of incentives for private zone
developers and operators. Zone developers are allowed to supply utilities
to tenants by treating them as indirect exporters.  Activities permitted
within the economic zones have also been expanded.
Incentives to ecozone export and free trade enterprises
a) Corporate income tax exemption for four years to a maximum of
eight years
b) Exemption from duties and taxes on imported capital equipment,
spare parts, materials, and supplies
c) After the lapse of income tax holiday, exemption from national
and local taxes; in lieu thereof, a special five percent tax rate on
gross income9
Tax Incentives and their Fiscal Measures to Attract FDI
__________________
9 Gross income refers to gross sales or gross revenues derived from business activity within the
zone, net of sales discounts, sales returns, and allowances minus costs of sales or direct costs.
The allowable deductions are direct salaries, wages or labor expenses, production supervision
salaries, raw materials used in the manufacture of products, goods in process, finished goods,
supplies and fuels used in production, depreciation of machinery and equipment, rent and utility
charges, and financing charges.FDI Investment System and FDI Inflows: the Philippine Experience
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d) Tax credit (equivalent to 25% of duties) for import substitution of
raw materials used in producing nontraditional exports
e) Exemption from wharfage dues, export tax, impost, or fee
f) Additional deduction for training expenses
g) Tax credit on domestic capital equipment (equivalent to 100% of
taxes and duties)
h) Tax and duty free importation of breeding stocks and genetic
materials
i) Tax credit on domestic breeding stock and genetic materials
(equivalent to 100% of taxes and duties)
j) Additional deduction for labor expense
k) Unrestricted use of consigned equipment
l) Employment of foreign nationals
m)Permanent residence status for foreign investors and immediate
members of the family
n) Simplified import-export procedures.
Incentives to ecozone domestic market enterprises
a) Exemption from national and local taxes and in lieu thereof,
payment of a special rate of five percent on gross income.
b) Additional deduction for training expenses
c) Incentives under the Build Operate and Transfer Law (BOT under
RA 6957 as amended by  RA 7718).
Incentives to ecozone developers/operators
a) Exemption from national and local taxes and in lieu thereof,
payment of a special rate of five percent on gross income
b) Additional deduction for training expenses
c) Incentives under the Build Operate and Transfer Law (BOT under
RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718).
SBMA- and CDC-registered enterprises: 1992 Bases Conversion
and Development Act
RA 7227, or the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992, was
enacted into law in March 1992 with the objective of accelerating the
development of the former United States military bases into special
economic zones. The Act created two administrative bodies, the Bases
Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) and the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), tasked with adopting, preparing, and
implementing a comprehensive development program for the conversion29
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of the Clark and Subic military reservations into special economic zones.
The BCDA is mandated to oversee and implement the conversion and
development of Clark and other military stations, while the SBMA is
mandated to oversee the implementation of the development programs of
the Subic Bay Naval Station and  surrounding communities. In 1993, EO
80 was issued establishing the Clark Development Corporation (CDC), as
the implementing arm of the BCDA for the Clark Special Economic Zone.
As earlier noted, the Supreme Court revoked these incentives in July
2005, stating that RA 7227 did not grant privileges to locators operating
in Clark.
Incentives
a) A final tax of five percent on gross income earned shall be paid in
lieu of all local and national taxes. (Gross income refers to gross
sales derived from any business activity less cost of sales, cost of
production, or direct cost of services.)
b) Tax and duty free importation of capital equipment, raw materials,
supplies, spare parts, and all other articles including finished
goods.
c) Permanent residency status for investors, their spouses, dependent
children under 21 years of age, provided they have continuing
investments of not less than US$250,000.
d) Employment of foreign nationals.
FDI approvals by agency
Table 3 and Figure 2 present the distribution of approved FDI by agency.
PEZA cornered the bulk of approved FDI with 75 percent of the total in
2000. It accounted for 39 percent of the total approvals in 2002 and 49
Table 3. Approved FDI (in million pesos)
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
BOI 43611.5 102036.5 28352.1 28340.7 119542.8
PEZA 156697.8 88320 38741.1 31346 30430.8
SBMA 4663.8 1836.8 4902.2 2359.3 2729.7
CDC 2912.5 1568.9 27548.3 1748.6 2302
Total 207885.6 193762.2 99543.7 63794.6 155005.2
Source: Board of InvestmentsFDI Investment System and FDI Inflows: the Philippine Experience
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percent in 2003.  In 2001, BOI was ahead with its share of 53 percent and
in 2004 with its share of 77 percent. CDC received substantial FDI
approvals in 2002 with its share of about 28 percent of the total.
Figure 2.Approved FDI by agency31
In the 1980s, FDI inflows to the Philippines were very small and erratic
owing largely to the economic and political instability that beset the country
throughout the decade (Table 4 and Figure 3). As a result, the Philippines
missed out on the rapid growth of Japanese FDI after the appreciation of
the yen following the Plaza Accord of 1985. During the period 1983–1989,
FDI inflows registered a negative average growth rate of -7.5 percent.
With the completion of the democratic transition process in the 1990s
along with FDI liberalization, substantial improvements were felt as FDI
inflows grew by 23.4 percent on the average from 1990 to 1999. However,
with another political turmoil in the early 2000s, average FDI inflows fell
by 8.69 percent between 2000 and 2003. As a percentage of GDP, average
FDI inflows increased from 0.54 percent of GDP in the 1980s to 1.21 percent
of GDP in the 1990s. In the recent period, this reached an average of
around 1.7 percent of GDP.
6 FDI Trends and Performance
Table 4. Trends in FDI, 1980–2003
Year    FDI Flow Nominal GDP FDI as % Year   FDI Flow Nominal GDP FDI as %
(US$ million)  (US$ million)   of GDP (US$million)  (US$ million)   of GDP
1980 229.5 32452.3 0.71 1992 328.0 52977.4 0.62
1981 306.8 35645.1 0.86 1993 377.7 54367.9 0.69
1982 343.9 37140.2 0.93 1994 881.9 64084.9 1.38
1983 275.6 33211.3 0.83 1995 815.0 74121.1 1.10
1984 146.6 31407.9 0.47 1996 1281.0 82847.2 1.55
1985 246.9 30734.8 0.80 1997 1053.4 82343.4 1.28
1986 108.3 29867.9 0.36 1998 884.7 65171.5 1.36
1987 96.4 33195.4 0.29 1999 2106.7 76157.1 2.77
1988 64.0 37884.9 0.17 2000 1398.2 75898.8 1.84
1989 202.8 42574.6 0.48 2001 857.8 71205.4 1.20
1990 195.9 44310.7 0.44 2002 1431.4 76692.8 1.87
1991 415.3 45416.9 0.91 2003 1488.2 78626.8 1.89
Sources: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and National Income AccountsFDI Investment System and FDI Inflows: the Philippine Experience
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Table 5 and Figure 4 present the distribution of total cumulative
flows across the major sectors from the eighties to the most recent period.
Total cumulative flows to the Philippines increased from US$2.03 billion
to US$8.34 billion between the 1980s (1980–1989) and the 1990s (1990–
1999). From 2000 to 2003, a total of US$5.16 billion was registered. FDI
stock, measured by total cumulative flows, stood at US$3 billion in 1989.
This increased to US$11 billion in 1990 and to US$16.6 billion in 2003.
In the 1980s, the bulk of FDI flows was concentrated in the highly
protected manufacturing sector particularly in the manufacture of chemical
and chemical products, food products, basic metal products, textiles and
petroleum and coal. The average share of manufacturing went up from
about 45 percent in the 1980s to 50 percent in the 1990s. Although with
the reduction of protection in the manufacturing sector, its average share
declined from 50 percent during the 1990s to around 31 percent in the
2000s. In the most recent period, FDI flows have been concentrated in the
financial sector.
Within the manufacturing sector, FDI inflows shifted toward the
production of machinery, appliances, and supplies as well as in petroleum
and coal products. The large share of petroleum and coal in the 1990s was
due to the privatization of Petron, a government-owned and controlled
company. The increase in machinery, appliances, and supplies can be
attributed to the large inflows of FDI to the electronics subsector that has
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Table 5. Distribution of foreign direct investment by sector (in percent)
Major Economic Sector  1980–1989 1990–1999 2000–2003
Total cumulative flows (in US$ million) 2027 8340 5164
Banks and other financial institutions 8.11 15.45 34.19
Banks 5.11 6.78 15.09
Other financial institutions 2.99 8.67 19.11
Manufacturing 44.70 50.08 30.65
Of which:
Chemical and chemical products 13.36 5.72 3.55
Food 9.29 7.10 14.52
Basic metal products 5.71 2.27 1.85
Textiles 2.17 1.80 0.02
Transport equipment 3.50 3.88 1.16
Petroleum and coal 2.14 10.77 1.23
Rubber - 0.60 0.01
Metal products exclusing machinery 0.33 1.22 -
Paper and paper products - 0.24 0.19
Machinery, appliances, supplies - 12.23 3.99
Nonmetallic mineral products - 2.27 3.34
Others - 1.34 0.49
Mining 32.44 5.68 10.56
Of which:
Petroleum and gas 28.15 1.66 10.54
     Copper 0.51 0.00 -
     Nickel - 0.06 -
     Geothermal - 3.26 0.01
     Others - 0.41
Commerce 5.05 7.63 3.23
Of which:
Wholesale 2.86 3.86 2.03
Real estate 1.23 3.42 1.20
Services 6.39 5.29 0.91
Of which:
Business 2.36 1.13 0.63
Others - 0.21 0.23
Public utility 1.13 11.94 17.82
Of which:
Communication 0.75 5.95 15.06
Water transport - 0.16 0.15
Land transport 0.04 0.01 0.04
Electricity - 5.39 1.54
Air transport - 0.20
Others - 0.05 1.03FDI Investment System and FDI Inflows: the Philippine Experience
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period, average FDI inflows appear to be strong in food manufacturing as
its share more than doubled from 7 percent in the 1990s to around 14.5
percent in the period 2000–2003. While the average protection of the
manufacturing sector has already declined, the food manufacturing
subsector has remained highly protected relative to other manufacturing
subsectors.
As indicated earlier, a lot of these changes in FDI flows and structure
may be explained by the substantial FDI liberalization over the past
Table 5 (cont’d.)
Major Economic Sector  1980–1989 1990–1999 2000–2003
Agriculture, fishery, and forestry 1.66 0.36 0.01
Of which:
Livestock and poultry - -
Fishery - 0.13 -
Agriculture 2.01 0.23
Others -
Construction 0.52 3.00 2.44
Of which:
Transport facilities 0.15 -
Infrastructure 0.66 0.70 0.10
Building - 0.17 0.02
General engineering - 1.10 2.31
Others - 1.00 0.01
Source: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
Figure 4.FDI distribution by sector35
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decade. In the case of banks and other financial institutions sector,
substantial increases in its share can be observed during the three periods
under study. The share of the financial sector went up significantly from
8 percent in the 1980s to 15 percent in the 1990s. In the most recent
period, its share further rose to about 34 percent. These increases in the
share of FDI cumulative flows to the financial sector coincided with the
major banking reforms legislated since the mid-1990s. Prior to 1994, there
were only four foreign banks in the country. These banks were heavily
regulated; they could not engage in universal banking and trust operations
and could not open new branches. Currently, there are a total of 19 foreign
banks operating the Philippines.
Public utility also experienced substantial increases in its share that
went up from 1 percent in the 1980s to 12 percent in the 1990s and to
around 18 percent in the period 2000–03. Within the sector, the
communication subsector received the largest cumulative FDI flows
increasing from less than one percent in the 1980s to 6 percent in the
1990s and to 15 percent in the most recent period under review.
In the past two decades, the share of mining fell drastically from 32
percent in the 1980s to around 6 percent in the 1990s; in the most recent
period, this went up to 11 percent. The share of agriculture, fishery, and
forestry is very low and has declined in all three periods under study.
Commerce, which includes wholesale and retail trade as well as private
services, saw increases in its share from 5 percent in the 1980s to 7.6
percent in the 1990s, though recently this dropped to around 3 percent.
Table 6 and Figure 5 show that in the last two decades, changes
were seen not only in the distribution of FDI by sector but also in the
Table 6. FDI inward stock by source
Country 1989 1999 2003 Country 1989 1990 2003
U.S.A. 55.92 24.59 21.25 Panama 0.69 0.44 0.30
Japan 14.53 21.56 22.13 Austria 0.59 0.24 0.17
Hongkong 5.81 6.55 5.01 Singapore 0.49 3.14 6.04
Netherlands 4.82 11.53 11.57 Denmark 0.59 0.22 0.30
U.K. 3.45 4.16 5.16 Luxembourg 0.45 0.48 0.34
Switzerland 2.23 7.88 5.50 Malaysia 0.35 0.85 0.95
Australia 1.92 1.22 0.99 N Hebrides 0.27 0.07 0.05
Canada 1.58 0.52 0.61 Bermuda 0.28 2.38 1.66
France 1.37 0.87 2.95 South Korea 0.27 1.37 1.05
Nauru 0.33 0.12 0.08 Taiwan 0.64 1.61 1.41
Germany 1.01 2.09 3.96 Virgin Islands 0.00 3.01 3.22
Sweden 0.88 0.42 0.29 Others 1.53 4.68 4.99
Source: Bangko Sentral ng PilipinasFDI Investment System and FDI Inflows: the Philippine Experience
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sources of FDI. Historically, the US was the Philippines’ largest source of
foreign investment. It is evident from the table that its dominance has
been substantially diluted by the presence of Japan, Netherlands, Hong
Kong, Singapore, UK, and Switzerland. Between 1989 and 1999, the
cumulative share of the US fell drastically from around 56 percent to 25
percent, respectively. This dropped further to about 21 percent in 2003.
The cumulative shares of Japan and Netherlands both increased from 15
percent to 22 percent and from 5 percent to 12 percent, respectively. Among
developing countries, Singapore and Hong Kong have been the most
important investors, followed by Taiwan, South Korea, and Malaysia.
Figure 5.FDI inward stock by source37
Table 7 presents FDI inflows data for the Philippines and other Asian
countries: Vietnam, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Indonesia,
Malaysia, Thailand, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore. It is evident
from the data that the Philippines has performed poorly and has lagged
behind the other countries. In terms of net FDI inflows, PRC is the largest
recipient. Far second is Singapore, followed by South Korea and Thailand.
The Philippines, along with Vietnam and Indonesia, is at the bottom of
the list. Note that during the period 1981–1985, Vietnam’s FDI inflows
were almost negligible. By the next period, however, it was able to overtake
the Philippines and during the period 1998–2001, its inflows were about
the same as those of the Philippines. In terms of FDI per capita, Singapore
tops the list followed by South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Thailand.
The Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia received the lowest FDI inflows.
Studies of the determinants of FDI inflows have found that the most
important factors on the ability of countries to attract FDI relate to the
investment climate (particularly the FDI regime and the effectiveness of
7 Comparative Performance of the Philippines
and Other Asian Countries
Table 7. Net FDI inflows in selected Asian countries
Country Net inflows (in current US$ billion) FDI per capita (US$ per person)
1981–1985 1993–1997 1998–2001 1981–1985 1993–1997 1998–2001
Philippines 0.06 1.41 1.47 1.2 20.6 19.5
Indonesia 0.24 3.87  -2.73 1.5 19.9  -13.3
Vietnam 0.01 1.98 1.42 0.1 27.0 18.2
Malaysia 1.08 4.75 2.60 73.5 230.3 113.8
Taiwan 0.19 1.59 3.05 10.0 74.3 136.8
Thailand 0.28 2.29 5.18 5.6 39.0 85.8
South Korea 0.12 1.67 6.81 2.9 36.8 145.5
Singapore 1.35 8.28 8.05 508.5 2316.4 2011.8
PRC 0.85 36.31 41.29 0.8 30.1 32.8
Source: Foreign Investment Advisory Service, World Bank, and International Finance Corporation (2005)FDI Investment System and FDI Inflows: the Philippine Experience
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FDI promotion), the economic competitiveness of the country, and its
growth prospects (FIAS/WB/IFC 2005). Box 2 summarizes three major
determinants and factors consisting of economic conditions, host country
policies, and strategies of multinational enterprises (MNE) that are
associated with the extent and pattern of FDI in developing countries.
In assessing the determinants of FDI inflows to the Philippines,
Aldaba-Mercado (1995) found a strong positive correlation between FDI
inflows and trade policy using effective protection rate as its indicator.
Her results also revealed significant positive relationships between FDI
and the stock of public investment (measure of infrastructure availability),
real gross domestic product (market size indicator), and real effective
exchange rate (competitiveness indicator with a real depreciation of the
peso affecting FDI flows positively). As expected, the results showed a
significant negative relationship between FDI and political stability. No
Box 2. Host country determinants of FDI
Economic z Markets Size, income levels; urbanization; stability and growth
conditions prospects; access to regional markets; distribution and
demand patterns
z Resources Natural resources; location
z Competitiveness Labor availability, cost, skills, trainability; managerial
technical skills; access to inputs; physical infrastructure;
supplier base; technology support
Host country z Macro policies Management of crucial macro variables; ease of
policies remittance; access to foreign exchange
z Private Sector Promotion of private ownership; clear and stable
policies; easy entry/exit policies; efficient financial
markets; other support
z Trade and industry Trade strategy; regional integration and access to
markets; ownership controls; competition policies;
support for SMEs
z FDI policies Ease of entry; ownership; incentives; access to inputs;
transparent and stable policies
MNE strategies z Risk perception Perception of country risk based on political factors,
macro management, labor markets, policy stability
z Location, sourcing, Company strategies on location, sourcing of products/
integration transfer inputs, integration of affiliates, strategic alliances,
training, technology
Source: Lall, S. 1997. Attracting foreign investment: new trends, sources, and policies. Economic Paper 31,
Commonwealth Secretariat39
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significant relationship between FDI and government investment incentive
policies was found.
Table 8 presents the ranking of the Philippines and other Southeast
Asian countries (out of a total of 102 countries in 2004 and 125 countries
in 2006) in terms of three sets of competitiveness indicators: growth
competitiveness, macro environment, and public institutions indices. The
growth competitiveness index covers measures of competitiveness such
as institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomy, health and primary
education, higher education and training, market efficiency, technological
readiness, business sophistication, and innovation. The macro environment
index is based on macroeconomic stability, country credit risk, and wastage
in government expenditures while the public institutions index is based
on measures of the enforcement of contracts and law and degree of
competition.
The table shows that for all three indicators, the Philippines together
with Indonesia performed substantially poorly than Malaysia and
Thailand. However, while Indonesia’s rankings have fallen between 2004
and 2006, those of the Philippines have increased.
A recent study by the Asian Development Bank (2004) seems to
confirm these findings. The study indicated that macro instability in the
Philippines remains a major concern for investors because of the country’s
serious fiscal problems. Moreover, the poor quality of key infrastructure
services, a fragile and underdeveloped financial system, and a perception
that contracting and regulatory uncertainty add to the costs of doing
business that also make investors hesitant. The surveyed firms identified
corruption and macroeconomic instability as the two biggest impediments
to a good investment climate in the Philippines. Electricity supply, security,
and regulatory uncertainty also figured prominently.
Table 8. Competitiveness indicators for selected Southeast Asian countries
Country Growth Competitiveness Index Macro Environment Index Public Institution Index
2004 2006 2004 2006 2004 2006
Malaysia 29 26 27 31 43 18
Thailand 32 35 26 28 37 40
Philippines 66 71 60 62 85 88
Indonesia 72 50 64 57 76 52
Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report, 2003-2004 and 2006-2007FDI Investment System and FDI Inflows: the Philippine Experience
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Table 9 shows a comparison of the business costs indicators for the
Philippines and its East Asian neighbors. The World Bank’s doing business
indicators showed the same concerns on costs of doing business as well as
complexity and uncertainty in contract enforcement. The data show that
in 2004 the Philippines was perceived as providing a less certain
environment compared with Indonesia, Thailand, China, and Malaysia.
The table reveals that, in general, except for the time to enforce a contract
indicator, the Philippines performed significantly below the other East
Asian countries especially in terms of corruption-related indicators. It had
the worst indicators for number of days to enforce a contract and
employment laws index.
However, the 2006 data reveal substantial improvements in the
country’s indicators such as time to start a business, cost to register
business, procedures to enforce contracts, and employments laws index
which all showed reductions. The same trend is observed among our
neighbors. Except for number of procedures to enforce a contract, Thailand
and Malaysia are still ahead of Philippine performance.
The ADB (2004) survey on business costs in the Philippines showed
differences in perceptions between foreign and domestic firms. In general,
the findings reveal that macro instability and corruption are the most
important constraints to business, followed by electricity and tax rates.
Table 9. Cost of doing business indicators
Country Number of Time to start Cost to register Procedures Time to enforce Employment laws
   start-up  a business business (% of  to enforce     a contract    index: range 0
procedures      (days) per capita GNI)  a contract        (days) (less rigid) to 100
      (very rigid)
Y e a r AB  A BAB AB  A  B AB
Philippines 11 11 59 48 24 18.7 28 25 164 600 60 39
PRChina 11 13 46 35 14 9.3 20 31 180 292 47 24
Malaysia 8 9 31 30 27 19.7 22 31 270 450 25 10
Hong Kong 5 5 11 11 2 3.3 17 16 180 211 27 0
Indonesia 11 12 168 97 15 86.7 - 34 225 570 57 44
S Korea 12 12 33 22 18 15.2 23 29 75 230 51 34
Singapore 7 6 8 6 1 0.8 23 29 50 120 20 0
Thailand 9 8 42 33 7 5.8 19 26 210 425 61 18
Vietnam 11 11 63 50 30 44.5 28 37 120 295 56 37
Note: A: 2003-2004 and B:2006-2007.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2004 and 200641
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Foreign firms, however, regard customs regulations, telecommunications,
transportation, labor regulations, crime, and labor skills as the most
important constraints.
Tables 10 and 11 present infrastructure indicators measured by
utility and real estate costs. Electricity and land acquisition costs in the
Philippines are the highest in the region. The country is also among the
highest in terms of internet and telecommunications costs as well as in
facilities lease.
Table 12 compares the corporate income tax rates in the six countries.
It is evident from the table that the in terms of statutory corporate income
tax rate, the Philippines has the highest rate. Given the availability of
income tax holidays, the effective rates are reduced considerably.
Table 13 presents the marginal effective tax rates in selected Asian
countries. After adjusting for interest deductibility, the marginal effective
Table 10.Utility costs
Country  Electricity     Water    Sewer    Telecom     Internet
(US$/KwH) (US$/cubic (US$/cubic (US$/minute    (US$/mo.
    meter)    meter)   to the US) T1 line equiv)
PRChina 0.08 0.21 0.18 0.25 5452
Indonesia 0.07 0.59 0.80 1.00 4863
Malaysia 0.07 0.51 0.66 0.24 4388
Philippines 0.10 0.21 0.19 0.30 5452
Thailand 0.06 0.31 0.17 0.56 4283
Vietnam 0.07 0.25 - 1.30 7497
Source: MIGA and World Bank, Benchmarking FDI Competitiveness in Asia, 2004
Table 11.Real estate costs
Country   Land acquisition          Building    Facilities lease       Office lease
           costs  construction costs (US%/square meter (US$/square meter)
(US$/square meter) (US$/square meter)        gross/mo.)         gross/mo.)
PRChina 35 97 - 25
Indonesia 66 221 7 11
Malaysia 60 282 - 12
Philippines 61 1022 5 7
Thailand 52 329 2 5
Vietnam - - 3 12
Source: MIGA and World Bank, Benchmarking FDI Competitiveness in Asia, 2004FDI Investment System and FDI Inflows: the Philippine Experience
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tax rate for the Philippines is higher than Malaysia or Singapore and is
almost the same as Thailand. After adjustments for customs duty
concessions, the effective rate for the Philippines drops to 40 percent but
still the highest among the four Southeast Asian countries. After
adjustments for income tax holidays, the Philippines’ effective rate is
reduced to only 21 percent, higher than Singapore and Thailand, but almost
at par with Malaysia.
In terms of other tax incentives, Table 14 shows that the Philippines,
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand offer almost similar incentives such
as tax holidays, reduced corporate income tax rates, investment allowances
and credits, import duty, and VAT exemptions; however, there are some
differences on the terms and conditions under which the incentives can
be availed of.
Box 3 presents a case study of the recent experience of the Philippines
in the automotive industry. Around the mid-1990s, the Philippines, along
with Thailand, was shortlisted by General Motors (GM) as site for its
assembly and parts manufacturing plant in Asia. The Philippines added
certain features in its motor vehicle program to make it more attractive
to GM. GM indicated that in terms of investment incentives, the two
Table 12.Corporate income tax rates
Country PRChina Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand Vietnam
Corporate 30 national tax; 10% first Rp50M 28 35* 30 25
Income Tax 3% local tax 15% next Rp50M
Rate  (in %) 30% exceeding
Rp100M
* Effective November 1, 2005, corporate tax rate has gone up from 32 percent  to 35 percent.
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit (2004)
Table 13.Marginal effective tax rate in selected Asian countries
Philippines Thailand Singapore Malaysia
With interest deductibility 47 46 33 30
Adjusted for customs duty concessions 40 35 33 22
Adjusted for tax holidays 21 7 14 22
Adjusted for depreciation carried forward 21 7  -7 22
Source: Foreign Investment Advisory Service (1999)43
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Box 3. On why General Motors favored Bangkok over Manila
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) started preparing for the liberalization of the
automotive industry in the early 1990s. The biggest plan was for the creation of the ASEAN Free
Trade Area (AFTA) that would reduce tariffs on cars and parts to a uniform rate of five percent by
June 2003. Western companies were excited with the prospects this plan would bring. Many auto-
motive companies saw the five percent tariff as low enough to allow the development of a pan-
regional marketplace for cars and car parts.
In anticipation of the AFTA, US automaker Ford decided to set up its factory in Thailand.
Another major US major truck manufacturer, General Motors (GM), was next to bet on free trade.
In 1995, GM announced that it was considering building a US$1 billion assembly plant and parts
manufacturing plant in Asia. In 1996, GM narrowed down its choice between either Bangkok or
Manila as site for its Asian regional headquarters. Both Indonesia and Malaysia expressed their
plans to pursue their own national cars, Timor and Proton, respectively. Thailand liberalized its car
importation in 1991, while the Philippines removed all quantitative restrictions on auto imports in
late 1995.
Around this time, the Philippines was producing an average of 11,447 vehicles per month
while Thailand was producing 45,114 units. In terms of sales, Thailand sold 571,580 units in 1995
compared to 129,000 units in the Philippines during the same year. Thailand had a combined
production capacity of 607,300 units while the Philippines had 230,000 units per year. Thailand
had around 350 car parts manufacturers; the Philippines had about 170.
In February 1996, the Philippines passed a new law that liberalized the automotive industry.
This legislation also prohibited car assemblers that intended to sell only to the domestic market
from importing semiknocked down (SKD-semiassembled cars without batteries and tires) units
while their assembly facilities were being set up. Previously, car assemblers were allowed to im-
port and use SKDs for six months, which could be extended for another six months. To accommo-
date the entry of GM, an additional feature was added in the new law allowing new entrants to
import SKD units to be sold in the domestic market, provided they would export at least 50 percent
of their CBU production (70 percent in case of foreign companies). In an interview with a BOI
official, it was revealed that this was one of the requests made by GM.
In a survey of US automakers’ ASEAN 4 (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines) strate-
gies  of  GM, Ford, and Chrysler (Big Three) conducted by the University of Michigan Transporta-
tion Research Institute (1999), the following advantages and disadvantages of Thailand and the
Philippines were seen as crucial in the production investments of the Big Three in Asia:
Advantages Disadvantages
Philippines No major manufacturer Logistics
Skilled, English-speaking workforce Real lack of qualified engineers and
Supportive government technical people
Existing (completely knocked down) Low education levels
CKD automotive assembly Reputation for activist unions
Past corruption under the Marcos regime
Smallest vehicle market among ASEAN 4
Thailand Supportive government Workforce quality
Free markets, allow imports Few English speakers
Existing CKD automotive assembly Education system weakest among ASEAN 4
Logistics Real lack of qualified engineers and tech-
Good labor relations nical people
Established infrastructure
Large light truck market
In July 1999, GM decided to establish its US$500 million facility in Thailand’s Rayong province.45
countries provided almost the same level. The case shows that more than
incentives, the crucial factors were market size, logistics, infrastructure,
free trade policy, perception of corruption, and activist labor unions.
Clearly, Thailand has won the lion’s share of investments as it emerged
as the choice of Japanese, American, and European carmakers as their
base to supply the whole of Asia.
Comparative Performance of the Philippines and Other Asian CountriesFDI Investment System and FDI Inflows: the Philippine Experience
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The recent literature on FDI determinants has shown that due to
increasing globalization and widespread liberalization, investment
incentives have become significant factors in the location decisions of
investors. Morriset and Pirnia (2001) indicated that the recent evidence
on growing tax competition in regional groupings such as the European
Union or at subregional level within one country like the United States
has shown that when factors such as political and economic stability,
infrastructure, and transport costs are more or less equal between potential
locations, then taxes may exert a significant impact. The experience of
the Philippines, however, tends to suggest that for a country with relatively
weak fundamentals, tax incentives, no matter how generous, will not be
able to compensate for the deficiencies in the investment environment.
The Philippines has considerably liberalized its FDI policies in the
last two decades. At the same time, it has implemented reforms in its
investment policy and investment incentive measures. Over time, however,
different investment incentive regimes evolved, managed by different
government bodies. In their effort to attract investors to locate in their
areas, different incentive packages emerged with new ones trying to be
more generous in terms of providing incentives. While the investment
policy reforms and opening up of more sectors to foreign investors in the
past decade resulted in improvements in FDI inflows to the country, on
the overall, FDI inflows to the Philippines have been limited. Hence, the
country’s performance has lagged behind its neighbors in East and
Southeast Asia.
To attract foreign investors to locate in the country, we tried to
compete with other countries in providing tax incentives. However, these
efforts resulted in a complicated investment incentive system. A complex
investment incentive system, combined with poor investment climate,
explains why the Philippines has performed badly in attracting FDI inflows
relative to its neighbors. This tends to show that in the absence of
fundamental factors such as economic conditions and political climate,
8 Summary and Policy Implications47
tax incentives alone are not enough to generate a substantial effect on
investment decisions of investors nor can they make up for the country’s
fundamental weaknesses.
There are costs associated with incentives and these hidden costs
have a direct negative impact on fiscal revenues. Reside (2006) found that
in 2004, 80 percent of BOI incentives were redundant, that is, these
investments would have been carried out even without the incentives. In
peso terms, this amounted to P43.2 billion in foregone revenues. For PEZA,
the redundancy rate was the lowest at 10 percent, SBMA at 17.5 percent
while Clark had 36 percent.
It is important to note that some of the existing fiscal incentives are
necessary to reduce the economic distortions caused by the structure of
protection. Incentive mechanisms allowing duty free importation of
intermediate inputs for export-oriented firms can address the existing
anti-export bias created by relatively high tariffs on intermediate and
capital goods. These mechanisms include duty drawback procedures
(though their administration is costly and cumbersome) and export
processing zones. On the other hand, fiscal incentives like income tax
holidays do not address this need to reduce anti-export bias.10
Given the large costs associated with tax incentives, there have been
moves to rationalize fiscal incentives but, so far, no legislation has been
passed to address this issue. Lawmakers have acknowledged that the
current system of incentives has been prone to corruption and other forms
of abuse and has grown unmanageable due to the many implementing
bodies governed by different laws. There is a pending bill at the Senate to
harmonize and simplify investment incentives under one legislation11—
the Investments and Incentives Code of the Philippines—to be adopted
by the different investment promotion agencies in the country. The bill
proposes to streamline the grant of incentives that are clear, simple, time-
bound, performance based, and at par with other countries in the region.
The Investment Priorities Plan (IPP) will include industries with high
comparative advantage, new product/service, and export-oriented products
and will be valid for a period of three years. Similarly, there are four
bills12 filed in the House of Representatives to rationalize the country’s
Summary and Policy Implications
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10 This was pointed out by Professor Felipe Medalla of the UP School of Economics.
11 Senate Bill 1104 was introduced by Senator Franklin Drilon in the Thirteenth Congress of the
Republic of the Philippines.
12 House Bill (HB) 271 was filed by Speaker Jose de Venecia; HB 122 by Representative Joey
Salceda; and HBs 1599 and 302 by Representative Jesli Lapus.FDI Investment System and FDI Inflows: the Philippine Experience
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investment incentives system by amending the existing Omnibus
Investments Code of the Philippines (EO 226).
There is no doubt that these reforms are necessary to address the
complexity of the country‘s incentive system and align it with international
best practices. However, it is important to emphasize that simultaneous
with this, efforts are needed to address fundamental factors such as the
modernization of our infrastructure, raising the level of education and
labor skills, upgrading existing technologies, increasing productivity, and
implementing improvements in the overall business climate. All these
together with our investment incentive program should form part of an
integrated approach for attracting FDI (Blomström and Kokko 2003).
Improving the fundamentals for economic growth will not only attract
FDI inflows but will also increase the chances for spillover benefits to
accrue to the private sector. To realize this, it is important that local firms
have the ability and motivation to invest in absorbing foreign technologies
and skills.
The case of Ireland, which has for a long time been considered a
preferred location for FDI, has shown that its success in attracting FDI
and benefiting from such was largely due to the country’s having the right
fundamentals (Barry and O’Malley 1999). It is also important to note that
the various incentives that it provided to foreign investors have also been
available to local companies. In Sweden, another successful country in
attracting FDI, the country’s industrial policy does not discriminate
between foreign and local companies.
To attract export-oriented FDI, Ireland as well as Singapore pursued
more integrated approaches by placing their FDI policies in the context of
their national development strategies and focusing on productivity
improvements, skills development, and technology upgrading (Blomström
and Kokko 2003).
It should be remembered that the new literature indicates that the
response of multinational corporations to changes in tax incentives depends
on their activities, motivations, market structure, and financing. In
general, the new literature shows that (as summarized in Morisset and
Pirnia 2001):
z The impact of tax rates on investment decisions is higher on export-
oriented companies than on those seeking the domestic market or
location-specific advantages. Taxes are an important part of the
cost structure of export-oriented firms because they operate in
highly competitive markets with very slim margins (Wells 1986).
z New firms prefer incentives that reduce their initial expenses49
(equipment and material exemption) while expanding firms prefer
tax incentives that target profits (Rolfe et al. 1993).
z Small investors are more responsive to tax incentives than large
investors (Coyne 1994).
As the Philippines tries to reform its tax incentive system, care must
be taken in discerning the implications of various suggested tax incentives
and instruments to attract FDI flows. Our previous investment incentive
experience has shown that given weak institutions in the country, this
can easily become a source of corruption. During the late 1990s, the
country’s tax credit system was weakened by cases of tax credit fraud due
to the proliferation of tampered, fake, and used tax credit certificates that
were sold and reused resulting in large costs to the government amounting
to billions of pesos in revenue losses. Hence, there is a need to carefully
weigh these incentive measures. As Morisset and Pirnia (2001) indicated,
the impact of tax policy may significantly depend on the tax instruments
used; for instance, a tax holiday and a general reduction in the statutory
corporate tax rate may have the same impact on the effective tax rate but
significantly different effects on FDI flows and on government’s revenues.
Currently, there are suggestions to replace income tax holidays with
lower corporate tax rates. Hong Kong, for instance, is quite different from
the rest of the Asian countries reviewed in the previous section as it offers
few special incentives but instead, provides a low unified corporate income
tax rate of 16 percent. This is almost half the typical standard rate in the
region.
There are also proposals to shift from net income to gross income
taxation. However, the business sector pointed out that this will put foreign
investors at a disadvantage because they will not be able to claim a credit
on their income tax that has been paid to the Philippine government.
Moreover, the group argued that the proposed system will shift the debate
on which expenses are considered parts of cost of goods sold. In the present
system, this is not an issue because firms can deduct all business expenses
regardless of whether they are included in the cost of goods sold or not. By
limiting the items to be deducted from direct costs, the business group
warned that this will only create incentives for firms to find more creative
ways to avoid taxes. Studies focusing on in-depth analysis of the impact of
different tax instruments will be needed to come up with an optimal
investment incentive policy for the Philippines. This is very crucial for us
given the need to sustain earlier fiscal reforms and the need to attract
substantial FDI flows.
Summary and Policy ImplicationsFDI Investment System and FDI Inflows: the Philippine Experience
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